The following article, continued from the September/October issue of The White Paper, is excerpted from "Contemporary Issues in Crime & Criminal Justice: Essays in Honor of Gilbert Geis," edited by Henry N. Pontell and David Shichor. The book, published this year by Prentice Hall, was assembled in honor of Dr. Geis on his 75th birthday. Dr. Geis is the longtime president of the Association. - ed. 

Edwin Sutherland came to the field of white-collar crime from a strong interest in conventional criminality. And for most of his work on street crime, he studied the behavior of individual criminals. Some of those criminals, such as those reflected in his data on corporate crime, acted in concert with others, while other criminals acted alone. But Sutherland never strayed far from the integrity of his subject matter within the following context.

Crime is an act defined as illegal by law. Sutherland never wavered from his strong belief that white-collar crime was technically, and in all other ways, crime. The simple idea that white-collar crime is indeed crime led to one of the most well-known debates in criminology, the Sutherland-Tappan debates. Criminologist Paul Tappan, a legally trained sociologist, took exception to Sutherland's contention that white-collar crimes were criminal acts. They were, Tappan argues, after all, not in most cases handled by the police, criminal prosecutors, or criminal courts, but in administrative courts with different procedures, legal rulings, and sanctions. White-collar crime was not criminal in either a technical or social sense, Tappan implied, and to argue that it was would merely promote a political agenda.

Tappan's legal training undoubtedly shaped a narrower, more technical view, and his position was hardly outrageous. There can be a substantial difference between the formulation and enforcement of criminal codes and the formulation and enforcement of other state-defined rules. But Tappan's restricted view of crime assumes that the differences between white-collar crime and conventional crime are not related to the power and influence of the offenders, important characteristics of white-collar crime.

Gilbert Geis, too, regards white-collar crime as real crime. White-collar crime is not a legal sleight-of-hand. Like Sutherland, Geis has understood well that in many cases the criminal law was not the initial point of reference because white-collar crimes were often found in the violations of administrative law. Yet, the violations of the rules of state agencies were backed by state sanctions, just as in street crime in which the offender breaks the rules (criminal law) of state agencies (legislatures) that are backed by state sanctions (e.g., imprisonment). In fact, aside from incarceration, the sanctions of most white-collar crimes are virtually identical to the sanctions of criminal laws.

Criminals are those who violate the law. This principle follows from the first. It mattered little to Sutherland that white-collar criminals were violating something other than criminal law; they were violating some law, and that law was backed by state-sanctioned penalties; so conceived, criminals are individuals who break the law, regardless of whether contained in the criminal code or some other body of state regulations.

Geis, too, regards criminals as real criminals, both in the technically legal and in a social sense. He notes that white-collar offenders violate real law with demonstrable legal intent. They are aware that what they are doing is wrong and they attempt to avoid legal punishment. In all these things, white-collar criminals are like conventional criminals. Where white-collar criminals differ from other criminals is the lack of shame they often display. As one of Geis's electrical equipment conspirators claimed, what he had done was illegal but not criminal. Geis regards such verbiage as "smoke-and-mirrors" and dismissed them as self-serving statements designed more to protect the offender's self-concept than to describe reality.

Corporate crime is merely the actions of individual offenders. Although Sutherland's major study concerned the violations of corporations, he maintained that the activity was merely the actions of individual offenders. In this sense, Sutherland's major work, which dealt with corporate crime, was a study in white-collar crime, as the title states explicitly.

Geis's major single work on white-collar crime may be an investigation into a corporate price-fixing case: the heavy electrical equipment conspiracy. This case was a large-scale example of corporate crime, but, like Sutherland, Geis draws out attention not to the aggregate dynamics of the case, but to the individuals and their personal actions in support of the conspiracy. There is nothing abstract about this case; it is filled with concrete illegal acts by specific individuals. The conspirators develop a code to hide their actions. For example, the term Christmas card list stood for the names of attendees at meetings in which prices were fixed, and choir practice stood for the meetings themselves. The conspirators used only public phones and met only at trade shows so that their association didn't look unusual. Nevertheless, when the Tennessee Valley Authority, one of the largest and most frequent consumers of the large electrical turbines of these companies, noticed irregularities, the case was broken.

After the legal dust settled, there had been four grand juries that issued 20 indictments on 45 persons and 29 corporations. These actions resulted in fines of $2 million, and seven of the conspirators were convicted. As with many cases of white-collar crime, however, Geis notes that those who were incarcerated received jail terms of 30 or less with up to five days off for good behavior. Victims of the conspiracy also sued two of the largest corporations, Westinghouse and General Electric, in civil court. General Electric paid out $160 million by 1964, a goodly amount even for a huge corporation, but Geis notes wryly that most of this was tax deductible! Even for a large corporate price-fixing case, the action is not with corporations as entities, but with the individuals in the corporations.

The Use of Case Studies. Sutherland and Geis generally adopted a "ground up" approach in studying crime. One of the reasons to examine white-collar crime from the basis of the offender is not merely that individual criminals are the basic unit of analysis for both Sutherland and Geis, but also because each of these scholars believe that the awareness of biographic and situational experiences of offenders is critical for understanding the nature of the crime and the circumstances that brought the offender to the crime. Sutherland's motivation for doing this may have been tempered heavily by this fundamental allegiance to his theory of crime, a theory that stresses an understanding of the learning experiences of offenders through time.

Sutherland's biography of a professional thief and Geis's account of the electrical equipment conspiracy are the most obvious examples of this grounded approach, but there are others as well. Geis's more recent work on physician fraud is rife with individual cases on physician wrongdoing drawn from newspaper accounts, interviews with doctors, and official case files from state and federal agencies.

Corporate Versus White-collar Crime

These elements of common ground between Sutherland and Geis are best illustrated in one issue: the nature of corporate crime and its relation to white-collar crime. The legal dimension of this issue is whether corporations, as distinct entities, may be held liable for corporate acts, while the social dimension is whether corporate crime is merely the actions of individuals within the corporation.

The legal issue has been settled largely in American law. For over a century, the criminal sanction has been an appropriate federal mechanism in response to corporate misconduct. The idea that corporations would be held criminally responsible actually extends back to 17th century English common law (Brickey, 1995, 9), but it was not until the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 that this idea was expressed in American law. The Sherman Act brought a combination of civil and criminal sanctions against corporate misconduct. Even so, the issue of the use and extent of criminal sanctions against corporations has been visited by the U.S. Supreme Court on several occasions in view of the fact that the financial impact of criminal fines on corporations could be borne ultimately by innocent stockholders. Closure has not yet been reached on a number of issues, including the extent to which corporations can be held criminally responsible for the conduct of their employees, the nature and extent of criminal penalties, and the objective these sanctions are attempting to achieve.

While federal law continually has considered corporations criminally liable, state laws developed slowly in this regard, and state statutes are uneven and sometimes inconsistent with federal law. One attempt to impose uniformity in criminal law, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, last revised in 1985, provided one basis for state statutes. Section 2.07 of that Code stipulates that a corporation may be convicted of a crime if:

The offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment. 

The Code further stipulates that such crimes may be acts of omission or commission and may be violations of criminal law or regulatory rules. It also stipulates, however, that corporations may defend themselves if by a preponderance of evidence (the usual civil, not criminal, standard) the corporation can prove it attempted through "due diligence" to prevent the crime. The distance between managerial supervision of "due diligence" and the actions of individual employees who are working without corporate approval represents an important stumbling block in prosecuting these crimes.

The notion of criminal liability is closely tied to that of individual guilt. One should not be convicted for something one did not intend to do. If so, how can corporations be prosecuted and punished for something they did not do if they did not authorize the employee's actions? Corporate crimes should not be the actions of employees acting alone or with personal motives. Corporate crimes must in some sense reflect corporate policy or, at least, show that the corporation benefited from a crime it did not reasonably prevent. In other words, courts should be satisfied that the acts of individual employees represent acts of the corporation, and that the actor who commits the crime acted within the scope of his or her authority and on behalf of the corporation. Present federal law does not require that the actor be highly placed in the corporation or that corporate management perform an active role in the crime.

Sutherland and Geis have approached the issue of whether white-collar crime refers only to individual offenders or aggregates of them in similar manner. As suggested earlier, Sutherland's major work dealt with the violations of corporations, but his attention never strayed far from the individual offenders within those corporations. His effort to apply differential association was focused on individual white-collar criminals, not the corporations as a whole. Geis, too, has been very grounded in his attention on individual white-collar criminals. A recent exchange with Braithwaite and Fisse reduces to the question of whether it is better to consider corporations themselves as offenders or whether the real offenders are the employees of the corporations. Braithwaite and Fisse argue that corporations in the modern world are real entities, legally and socially. Corporations act with unified purpose, and at times those acts are illegal. Geis (1995) rejects this position as needlessly abstract, preferring instead to merely regard corporate violations as the actions of individual offenders. It is, after all, he argues, not Amoco or General Motors who violates laws, but specific corporate employees who may be acting on behalf of the corporation. Whether their intent is self- or corporate-gain, these offenders are in the most real of worlds the individuals who violate the law.

Defining the Field

If there is one persistent issue in the field of white-collar crime, it is its definition. More scholars have weighed in on this topic than perhaps any other, and there is relatively little to show for this fervent attention.

Sutherland evidently was not much interested in a definition of white-collar crime either because he thought it wasn't necessary (perhaps because his theory would explain all crime anyway, regardless of precise definition) or because he himself was confused about it.2 His research prior to the publication of his white-collar crime book dealt with the behavior of individual criminals, while his study of the 70 largest corporations in the United States - his major research effort on the topic - involved aggregate data. Perhaps Sutherland didn't sense a contradiction here. After all, one could argue that corporate behavior is merely the behavior of the individuals in the corporation, although it is virtually conventional wisdom in criminology today that white-collar crime and corporate crime involve important behavioral and contextual differences that recluse that kind of conceptual reductionism (see Tonry and Reiss, 1993).

It also should be recognized that Sutherland's path-breaking work was possible in part because of his not narrowing his inquiry to fit some particular definition of white-collar crime. Had Sutherland addressed the definitional issue in 1949 as some scholars have today, the field might look even more parochial and confusing than it presently does. Without a restricting definition to clutter his way, Sutherland was free to span both individual and collective levels of behavior and to identify illegal acts regardless of which body of law defined the acts as illegal.

Sutherland began his interest in, and study of, "violations of law by businessmen" in the late 1920s (Sutherland, 1973, 78). His work was sporadic and was presented initially in his presidential address before the American Sociological Association. Even in his initial scholarly foray, however, Sutherland didn't dwell on definitional issues, although he did indicate that "white-collar crimes in business and the professions consist principally of the violation of delegated or implied trust…." (Sutherland, 1940, 3). This definition was largely ignored in the empirical work on white-collar crime that followed shortly after the publication of Sutherland's book. Clinard's (1952) study of the violations of the Office of Price Administration during World War II and Hartung's (1950) study of violations in the wholesale meat packing industry addressed, in turn, the two levels at which white-collar crime can be said to operate - the individual and corporate.3 Clinard's offenders were individuals, while Hartung's were businesses, exactly like those found in Sutherland's own research. Clinard (1952, 227) notes that white-collar crime refers to "violations of the law committed primarily by groups such as businessmen, professional men, and politicians in connection with their occupations…" after which he cites virtually all of Sutherland's publications on the subject.

Subsequent work would divide precisely along this individual-aggregate dimension with work by Cressey (1953) on embezzlement (individual) and Geis (1967) on price-fixing on the heavy electrical equipment industry (collective). But the individual-aggregate dimension has been difficult to maintain in some instances because, again, one could always argue, as Geis did, that although Westinghouse and General Electric were the major companies involved, the price-fixers were individuals (see also Geis, 1995).

Geis has never been quick to enter the definitional debate. Like Sutherland, Geis may regard white-collar crime as either so obvious not to require much explication, or more likely as so hopelessly muddled, it is better left alone. "The task of defining white-collar crime," he wrote, "is in many ways wearisome, perhaps best left to those with a predilection for medieval theological debates" (Geis, 1982, 152). And, in an earlier statement, Geis's (1974, 256) frustration was even more acute: "The semantic waters have been so muddied by Sutherland that today it seems wisest to move upstream rather than to attempt a purification project."

While one solution is to ignore the definitional issue, the other is to abandon the term altogether. But Geis rejects the idea of discarding the term white-collar crime because he thinks it is still useful, he maintains, in galvanizing public opinion: "However metaphorical and imprecise, the term white-collar crime conjures up a real set of ills and is particularly satisfactory in solidifying an emotional and intellectual concern about such ills" (Geis, 1982, 152). Rather than change the term and in the absence of an agreed-upon definition of white-collar crime, Geis advocates the development of taxonomies based on the content of law, the degree of harm, characteristics of offenders, modus operandi, and types and nature of victims.

There is much to commend such a strategy. Even a national conference in 1996, sponsored by the National White Collar Crime Research Center (NWCCRC), failed to produce an unambiguous definition. Speaking of "deviance" and "elites," conferees hammered out a relatively short definition, but there are problems with it. Definitions are neither right nor wrong, but more or less useful, and if researchers and theorists find the NWCCRC definition useful, so be it. But two facts remain: there had never been a completely satisfactory definition of white-collar crime, and the field has prospered enormously without one.

Extending Sutherland

It is tempting - but ultimately unfruitful - to speculate where Sutherland's attention would have turned in his study of white-collar crime. Perhaps to more work refining his study of the largest corporations, perhaps to studies of particular types of white-collar crime, or perhaps to more direct applications of differential association to white-collar crime. Sutherland's death left a vacuum created by a talented criminologist who had been concerned about white-collar crime for perhaps 20 years. The then "new breed" of scholars whose work followed Sutherland (Clinard, Cressey, Hartung) simply had been at it for a short time and failed to show the breadth of interest reflected in Sutherland's work. Perhaps for these reasons, this work failed to create continued interest in white-collar crime.

By the time Geis began to write about white-collar crime, the field was languishing. No one was paying systematic attention to it, and there were no prospects for Sutherland's work being anything other than an initial foray without follow-up. Geis's work changed that by resuscitating a topic that was virtually comatose. Geis provided a neglected historical and intellectual context to our understanding of white-collar crime and did so without the dual burden of developing the field and a general theory of crime at the same time. These, in fact, are important intellectual legacies, and without them it is doubtful that white-collar crime would have become the popular topic it is now.

Theoretical Ecumenism

Sutherland was associated closely with a powerful theory of crime. Differential association was intended to be a general theory applicable to all crime, and the topic of white-collar crime afforded Sutherland an opportunity to show the power of the theory in a difficult test. As noted earlier, the area of white-collar crime is a particularly tricky test for theory because most criminological theory - virtually all theory at the time Sutherland was writing - was predicated on the notion that the task of theory was to show how people become criminal from a state of non-criminal innocence. Virtually by definition, white-collar criminals have little or no background in crime and few if any associations with conventional criminals. Their criminality comes later in the life cycle, so any theory of white-collar crime must necessarily "kick in" when these individuals are otherwise law-abiding adults. It was intellectually courageous for Sutherland to attack such a special type of crime with theoretical armament developed from conventional crime.

There are at least two major perspectives on crime causation, one that emphasizes larger social, economic, and political forces (a structural approach), and one that focuses on people and the worlds they perceive and experience (a social psychological approach). Each of these perspectives has proved useful and they dominate different traditions in criminology and the study of white-collar crime. Geis and Sutherland favor a social psychological approach but they part company from one another in thinking that conventional and white-collar crimes are explainable within the same theoretical framework. While Sutherland maintained that a single theory was able to explain white-collar crime as well as conventional crime, a viewpoint held by several more modern criminologists (e.g., Gottredson and Hirschi, 1990; Wilson and Hernnstein, 1985), Geis has maintained that white-collar crime is a distinctive form of criminality, that the white-collar offenders are qualitatively different from conventional criminals, and that, as a result, different theoretical approaches may be required. It is also possible that efforts to control white-collar crime may be quite different from those used in restraining conventional criminality, although Geis has advocated consistently the use of the criminal sanction in the control of white-collar criminals.

Geis largely has eschewed allegiance to the lure of a grand theory of crime, including white-collar crime, and his approach may more aptly be considered an example of theoretical agnosticism. His approach to white-collar crime is not atheoretical, but it does not show the commitment to a particular theoretical perspective like that of Sutherland. Geis's writings are probably more accurately descriptive rather than theoretical, although his work does show awareness of various theoretical perspectives. The tendency toward description runs in two directions. First, Geis has written a number of "overview" papers that place white-collar crime in legal, historical, and social context. These papers are aimed at affirming the illegal quality of the acts, the serious consequences or harms from white-collar crimes, and the necessity to strengthen control efforts over this type of offending. Second, Geis has adopted a particularistic approach to his empirical work on white-collar crime. This approach relies heavily on the use of case studies of specific offenses or groups of offenses, such as the heavy electrical equipment conspiracy and physician fraud in California. The use of case studies and an examination of collections of case accounts may not lend itself to theory testing.

As a result, Geis does not tackle white-collar crime through the lenses of a particular theoretical agenda and, in fact, his specific theoretical approach may appear sometimes obscure. Much of his writings read as though they were written by an informed observer describing what he sees and little more. Such an approach may reflect his methodological allegiance to the muckrakers at the turn of the century, who were appalled at the negative consequences of power. But Geis's apparent theoretical eclectism doesn't get in the way of his research. Geis always is sensitive to the context in which the crimes occur and the larger picture of societal reaction and enforcement.

Historical and Intellectual Context

Throughout Geis' work, the theme of context is recurrent. Although trained as a sociologist, Geis draws from multidisciplinary sources and insights to create his vision and understanding of white-collar crime. These sources are varied and reflect, among other things, Geis's academic appointment in a multidisciplinary department since 1970, his keen appreciation for the nuances and insights found in literary sources, and a profound respect for the larger forces of culture, economics, politics, and history. It is difficult to identify the importance of context as an explicit theme in Geis's work, but he continually seeks to remind us that crime ultimately is related to place, time, and history. We make small excursions into understanding crime through empirical work, but most of that work is unrelated to other work and stands on its own.

Geis has never advocated doing scholarly work on the topic of white-collar crime; instead, he has suggested that different types of white-collar crime be studied individually so that common elements among types can be identified. He has attempted to do this with his early work on economic white-collar crime and his later work on professional white-collar crime.

In his work on physician fraud, Geis and his colleagues (Jesilow, Pontell and Geis, 1993) attack a problem in white-collar crime that is especially troublesome. People in business are oriented toward the profit motive, and their illegal actions might be intuitively understandable given this self-serving orientation. People in the professions, however, are supposed to be oriented toward the needs of their clients, not self-interest. While we might not be surprised if a member of some occupation took advantage of consumers and we might even expect it from some occupations, professionals are supposed to be working for the greater good, for the needs and desires of their patients, students, and clients. They are supposed to have their main allegiance to the professional standards of law, medicine, education, pharmacy, or whatever professional group to which they belong. It is this other-orientation that reserves for professionals high status and income, as well as a high degree of occupational autonomy in which professionals are evaluated by other professionals in the same profession rather than some outside agency.

The wayward physicians share important characteristics with other white-collar criminals. They are powerful, of high status, and seldom questioned, and their acts can have serious physical, financial, and social impacts. There is little doubt that physicians can and do violate the law, and these violations are screened by a cloak of respectability. In professionalism there are all sorts of room for mischief. Professionals may not be socialized properly about appropriate responses when faced with economic pressures. They may abuse their professional autonomy and usually are protected from public scrutiny by their social status. Furthermore, peer review may not be the best way to control professional miscreants if the controllers are themselves likely to be violators.

Geis understood that white-collar crime lacked the public outrage reserved for street crime. Like Sutherland, Geis has generally advocated the use of criminal sanctions where possible to control this behavior, but without public support or pressure it has seemed unlikely that individual white-collar criminals would face more than monetary sanctions, except in a few instances. Recent surveys show that the public increasingly believes white-collar crime is both serious and wrong. However, this shift in public attitudes has yet to translate into direct legislative attention; there has been no "getting tough" approach to white-collar crime found with street crime in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, the populist beliefs that propelled Sutherland and to which Geis subscribes may yet yield criminal dividends in the future.

Geis's interest in types of white-collar crime, and even his seemingly separate work on witch trials (Geis and Bunn, 1997), reflects his keen eye for details and the importance of building a more general understanding from the actions of specific cases. Clearly, the stuff of criminology resides largely in the actions of specific individuals and the consequences of those actions on society and the legal system. It is a Sutherland legacy, to be sure, but it is a case that required the kind of sustained attention only given it by Geis.

Conclusion

White-collar crime is a popular topic. At present, there are college courses, textbooks, research monographs, research grants, a coterie of scholars who identify with the topic, and a public that has been more greatly informed by all of this work. Gilbert Geis is an important reason for all of this. Geis extended Sutherland's realism without pushing a theoretical agenda. He has striven to maintain the integrity of the subject of white-collar crime: illegal acts by individual criminals with discernible victims. While it is clear that there would be no study of white-collar crime without Sutherland's initial work, it should be equally clear that the field of white-collar crime would not have progressed to its present lofty state without the work of Gilbert Geis.

Robert F. Meier is professor and chair of the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska - Omaha. He is the author or editor of 15 books, original and revised editions, and more than 50 articles in professional journals.  

Book ordering information: Readers may order "Contemporary Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honor of Gilbert Geis," edited by Henry N. Pontell and David Shichor, for 20 percent of the list price at www.prenhall.com/policestore or for the list price at 800-282-0693.  

2. The definition Sutherland employees in his book is prefaced by the word approximately, and indication that he strove for a more broad conception of white-collar crime rather than a more narrow definition. There is another interpretation, certainly, of why Sutherland used the word approximately: Edwin Lemert (1972, 43-44) once asked Sutherland what he meant by the term white-collar crime. Sutherland replied that he was not exactly sure.

3. Clinard's research grew out of his work with the Office of Price Administration in Washington, D.C. from 1942 to 1945 where he was chief of the Analysis and Reports Branch in the Enforcement Department. Hartung's article was a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation completed the previous year at the University of Michigan, perhaps the first doctoral dissertation white-collar crime.

References 

Brickey, Kathleen F. 1995. Corporate and White-Collar Crime: Cases and Materials. 2nd ed. Boston: Little Brown.
Clinard, Marchsll B. 1952. The Black Marker: A Study of White Collar Crime. New York: Rinehart & Company.
Cressey, Donald R. 1953. Other People's Money. New York: Free Press.
Geis, Gilbert, 1967. "The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961." Pp. 139-150 in Criminal Behavior Systems, eds. Marshal B. Clinard and Richard Quinney. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Geis, Gilbert. 1974. "Avocational Crime." Pp. 273-298 in Handbook of Criminology, ed.
Daniel Glaser, Chicago: Rand McNally.
Geis, Gilbert, and Colin Goff. 1983. "Introduction" in White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version, ed. Edwin H. Sutherland, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Geis, Gilbert, Robert F. Meier, and Lawrence S. Salinger, eds. 1995. White-Collar Crime: Classic and Contemporary Views. New York: Free Press.
Geis, Gilbert. 1995. "A Review, Rebuttal, and Reconciliation of Cressey and Braithwaite and Fisse on Criminological Theory and Corporate Crime." Pp. 399-428 in The Legacy of Anomie Theory, Freda Adler and William S. Laufer, eds., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Geis, Gilbert, and Ivan Bunn. 1997. A Trial of Witches: A Seventeenth-Century Witchcraft Prosecution. London: Routledge.
Gottfredson, Michael, and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General Theory of Crime. Stanfor, CT: Stanford University Press.
Hartung, Frank E. 1950. "White-Collar Offenses in the Wholesale Meat Industry in Detroit." American Journal of Sociology, 56: 25-35.
Jesilow, Paul, Henry Pontell, and Gilbert Geis. 1993. Prescription for Profit: How Doctors Defraud Medicaid. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lemert, Edwin M. 1972. Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control, 2nd ed.Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Sutherland, Edwin H. 1940. "White-Collar Criminality." American Sociological Review, 5:1-12.
Sutherland, Edwin H. 1949. White Collar Crime. New York: Dryden.
Sutherland, Edwin H. 1973. On Analyzing Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tonry, Michael, and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., eds. 1993. Beyond the Law: Crime in Complex Organizations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, James Q., and Richard Hernnstein. 1985. Crime and Human Nature.